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1. INTRODUCTION
We are often not at one with ourselves. The empirical observation that people
tend to reverse choices as time passes is not new and has challenged economists
for quite some time. One basic explanation is the existence of uncertainty and
the fact that people update their beliefs. Harder to match with neoclassical the-
ory is the observation that some people are obviously willing to spend scarce
resources to restrict their options in the future. From the viewpoint of neoclas-
sical economics it would be intuitive to keep as many possibilities as you can.
At a later point in time you can always choose irrespective of your less preferred
options but you have them available for the case of having gained more valuable
information. Note that the problem is not simply about reducing one’s searching
costs, for instance, by asking the waiter to only bring the ﬁrst page of a menu.
One intentionally excludes certain future options from his choice set. This fact
denotes that people are aware of systematic inconsistencies in their choice behav-
ior and do not like that. Apart from the psychological appeal of the problem, it is
illuminating from a theorist’s perspective as it raises methodologically relevant
questions. These boil down to the one central question: Whom do we consider
as the actor in an economic model?
We aim to explain the formation of resolutions and the emergence of their
certain extent. First, we want to take the psychological notion of intrapersonal
conﬂict serious by modelling this behavioral ambivalence. Second, we present
a model that creates falsiﬁable hypotheses and is therefore open for empirical
testing of its predictions. For this reason it is restricted to only a few measurable
parameters. We use a dual selves model. The motivation for this concept is brieﬂy
addressed in the second section. The third section describes the psychological
superstructure of the problem we consider here with the help of an example.
The fourth and ﬁfth section contain the formal model. The sixth section oﬀers
a conclusion.
2. ‘MULTIPLE SELVES’ AS AGENTS
The notion of multiple selves becomes an interesting tool if we think of a
conﬂict within a person. The word ‘conﬂict’ makes it meaningful to regard the
person not as a uniﬁed decision-maker but as a composition of at least two
decision-makers who are engaged in strategic interaction.1 Moldoveanu and
Stevenson (2001) point out that the so-called Aristotelian modelling tradition
is dominant in the social sciences. This view considers the person as a unitary
preference system which equates the biological entity with the entity of decision-
making. The so-called Heraclitean tradition on the other hand considers persons
as fragmented, internally torn apart, “or as an ongoing and irresolvable conﬂict of
competing interests, impulses, or identities.” (Moldoveanu and Stevenson
1We will avoid the term ‘individual’ as from its root it means ‘the indivisible’. In our
methodological context a person should therefore not be seen as an individual but as a dividual.
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2001, p. 295) While in game theory it is quite common to model a person as
a multitude of decision-makers (see, for instance, G¨ uth 1991), the Aristotelian
tradition is the orthodox perspective of microeconomists. For some, maybe even
for most economic problems this can be a useful assumption.
But there is nothing in the foundations of neoclassical economics that forces
us to view the biological person as the primitive actor. In our view, there exists
a class of microeconomic decision problems where the biological entity as the
primitive actor is not very suitable. In these situations decomposing the person
into several agents can be rewarding. It enables us to account for phenomena
of behavioral economics without the necessity to forgo the analytical rigour of
neoclassical theory. The concept of agency allows us to stick to the convenient
assumption of stable preferences as an agent cannot experience a preference re-
versal by deﬁnition. This is because clear intentions due to stable preferences are
exactly what constitutes an economic agent. The selves in our model are nothing
but economic agents with conﬂicting preferences. In our opinion, forming reso-
lutions and taking actions against future options is a problem in which multiple
selves can add theoretical insights.
Thomas Schelling is the most popular advocate of the notion of multiple selves
in economic literature, he argues that “Everybody behaves like two people, one
who wants clean lungs and long life and the other who adores tobacco, or one
who wants a lean body and the other who wants dessert” (Schelling 1984, p.
58). There are several attempts by other authors to formalize Schelling’s ideas.
Most of these papers focus on the time aspect of choice behavior and emphasize
a conﬂict between short-term and long-term interests (see, for instance, Thaler
and Shefrin 1981, as a classical reference, or O’Donoghue and Rabin 2005
and Fudenberg and Levine 2006 for more recent approaches). This is related
to hyperbolic discounting models (see, for instance, Strotz 1956 or Laibson
1997) where choice inconsistencies result due to a perspective change as the
person advances on a timeline. The persons in these models have an ‘immediacy
bias’ expressed by a hyperbolic discounting function.
Our focus is diﬀerent. Even though timing plays a role in our analysis it is
not the explanatory driver of the intrapersonal conﬂict we have in mind. We ex-
amine the conﬂict a person experiences due to diﬀerent preferences in diﬀerent
states of the world abandoning any discounting. We encounter state-dependency
if the state of the world is of direct concern to the preference relation of a per-
son (Karni 1993, p. 188). The uncertainty in our model is connected to the
upcoming social environment and not concerning the type of one’s own future
selves which is an alternative way to capture uncertainty. In contrast to hyper-
bolic discounting models with uncertainty about one’s own future type we keep
preferences ﬁxed and make them common knowledge. This makes our problem
more salient. It guarantees for an inner conﬂict, whereas a hyperbolic discounting
framework with unknown ‘immediacy bias’ results in a lottery of whether or not
being able to stick to one’s plans. In such as setting, exposing oneself to certain
situations would mean to gamble and make it somehow cumbersome to interpret
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resolutions. It would then be more meaningful to raise the question whether one
enters the risk of getting plans spoiled by a ‘weaker self’ or whether one chooses
some kind of outside option. Additionally, in our view, the focus on time in hy-
perbolic discounting models makes personal welfare calculations rather diﬃcult,
since it is not clear at what point in time one should employ them.
Apart from that most of the papers focus on the use of external commitment
devices to account for a lack of willpower. This is despite the fact that personal
rules like resolutions are probably more common (Ainslie 2001, pp. 78 - 85).
B´ enabou and Tirole (2004) is a rare example of analyzing personal rules as
an internal commitment device. Embedded in an enriched quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting framework they are emphasizing the aspect of imperfect recall concern-
ing one’s own motives. In their view, when uncertain about my own willpower,
my past choices can give an indication of what kind of person I am and give me
self-conﬁdence. In the presence of imperfect recall, resolutions can be compared
to journal keeping and help to regularly scrutinize one’s behavior (B´ enabou
and Tirole 2004, p. 879). Resolutions activate lapse-related memory ex post
or make some actions more salient ex ante. An interesting implication of their
model is that over time a subject can employ overly rigid rules or compulsive
behavior, if self-signaling becomes an end in itself. This means that people regard
any situation as a test of their willpower even if self-restraint is not desirable ex
ante (B´ enabou and Tirole 2004, p. 851). Their concept of resolutions is more
complex than the one discussed here since they are taking a dynamic perspective
and focus on memory determination. In our static approach, as opposed to that,
a resolution should not be compared to a cognitive rule but to a quantiﬁable
concession combined with a consumption barrier.
This interpretation is closer to Brocas and Carrillo (2008), who propose
a neurologically motivated principal-agent-approach. But their focus is clearly
on informational asymmetries. They emphasize the aspect of ‘incentive salience’
which describes a bias in the utility function of the myopic agent towards exces-
sive consumption of an enjoyable good. Under complete information the principal
could impose her optimal choices. Under incomplete information the principal is
forced to implement a revelation mechanism to induce self-selection of the agent
which costs resources. The decision problem arises as a tension between induc-
ing self-selection and managing resources (Brocas and Carrillo 2008, pp.
1330 - 1331). In this view, there exists a multitude of agents, where each time-
indexed agent learns about his current willingness to consume once he appears.
The principal only knows the distribution of agent types.
Note that the selves in our model are neither suﬀering from naivity or im-
perfect recall concerning their future or past choices, nor are they subject to
informational asymmetries. ‘Incentive salience’ in our context results only from
diverging evaluations of the same prospect depending on the state a person is
in. Therefore we use symmetric utility functions for both selves. Evaluations are
stable and common knowledge, thus, we restrict our analysis to two deterministic
selves. Uncertainty stems from the fact that one does not know the setting in
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which a good will be consumed, and accordingly, how costly it will be to break
a formed resolution. In our model, there is no principal-agent-hierarchy between
both selves but a strategic advantage of the planner. The restriction to two selves
is of course arbitrary from a psychological or philosophical perspective but due
to reasons of simplicity given our explanatory goal. With a dual selves model
and our speciﬁc uncertainty context quantitative resolutions can be captured
and analyzed in a reasonable way.
3. AN EXAMPLE OF INTRAPERSONAL CONFLICT
Consider a person who in the afternoon is invited to an evening party. The
person has a split attitude towards alcohol. When being at home she dislikes
alcohol because she thinks it is unhealthy. From her view at home the less alcohol,
the better it is. But when being at parties she always enjoys drinking. She would
then like to drink excessively. She is aware of this behavioral pattern.2 This
fact relates to the idea of ‘sophistication’ in hyperbolic discounting models (see,
for instance, O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999), where it means to be aware of
your ‘immediacy bias’ which will spoil your plans. ‘Sophistication’ means not to
underestimate this ‘immediacy bias’ even though you might not precisely know
its magnitude (O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001). If you are unsure whether this
bias exists at all, as it depends on factors you cannot foresee, you are uncertain
about the type of your own future selves. Accordingly, you do not know what
your later preferences will be.
We are considering ‘sophistication’ in a diﬀerent uncertainty context that we
ﬁnd suitable for the analysis of resolution formation. In our analysis the person
at home is sure about her inverted preferences at the party. Therefore she knows
that she will have to deal with an opponent. Anticipating this tension the person
at home can form a resolution. This could be the strictest possible resolution of
abstinence or a generous resolution to drink in moderation. We assume that
the resolution sets up an inhibition threshold that is psychologically costly to
overcome. Economically speaking, such a resolution would be useless if it would
be costless to break. The height of this inhibition threshold depends on the
social environment at the party. It is clear to the person ex ante that the social
environment at a friend’s birthday party is more likely to cause a low inhibition
threshold than the one at her grandparent’s golden wedding, for example.
A second consequence of the resolution is that it sharpens the awareness of
consumption ambivalence. If we had not regarded the consumption as problem-
atic why would we have formed a resolution in the ﬁrst place? If the person at the
2Smith uses the allegory of an impartial spectator who is able to judge from a distance.
“There are two diﬀerent occasions when we examine our own conduct, and endeavour to view
it in the light in which the impartial spectator would view it; ﬁrst when we are about to act,
and secondly, after we have acted. (...) When we are about to act, the eagerness of passion
will seldom allow us to consider what we are doing with the candour of an indiﬀerent person.
(...) The fury of our own passions constantly calls us back to our own place, where every thing
appears magniﬁed and misrepresented by self-love.” (Smith 1759, pp. 261 - 262)
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party adheres to the resolution, this ambivalence dilutes the joy of consumption
through a cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957). Succeeding to say “The heck
with it, drinking is what parties are there for!” means achieving cognitive conso-
nance and breaking the resolution. The person at the party has liberated herself
and is no longer ‘locked’ in the resolution world of ambivalent consumption, i.e.
cognitive dissonance.
Without a resolution there would not be any inhibition threshold or cognitive
dissonance and the person at the party would simply get drunk. This prospect is
seen as worst case from the person at home. Forming a resolution is therefore a
dominant strategy for the person at home. But for her it is often not rational to
form the strictest possible resolution of abstinence, which could seem natural at
ﬁrst glance. The person at home is encountering the following dilemma. Given
her preferences she prefers abstinence. But she knows that the person at the party
would be frustrated and breaking the resolution becomes the more attractive the
more frustrated she is. If suﬃciently frustrated the person at the party would even
at relatively high cost caused by a high inhibition threshold break the resolution.
To avoid this worst case, the person at home forms a more generous resolution
allowing the person at the party to drink some alcohol to reduce frustration.
From this reasoning we can clearly see that a generous resolution of the person
at home is not motivated by altruism but by prevention of excess consumption
at the party.
Note that this is of course only one example out of a larger class of problems
to which our logic applies. Alternatively, think of any state-dependent habit
where a person in a complement state forms a resolution to restrict this habit.
In this state she prefers herself to abstain from the habit but fears intemperance
once her ‘weaker self’ crosses the frontier. It is likely that a strict resolution will
be broken in an environment that causes low inhibition thresholds by trend. A
limited concession is then considered as the lesser of two evils. We speak of any
situation where preferences are clear but the environment in which a habit in
question is indulged is uncertain. Take as another example a person that plans
to write a thesis in the afternoon. When planning, she is convinced that it is best
to watch no television at all. But she also knows that this is likely to lead to such
a level of frustration when the afternoon program starts that she will break the
resolution and watch the whole program. Thus, she explicitly allows herself to
consume precisely one or precisely two hours of television. The costs of breaking
this resolution depend on the quality of the program and she has a probilistic
idea about this. As a third example think of a social smoker who is inevitably
feeling the urge to smoke in the presence of other smokers. Limitting herself ex
ante to abstinence will probably lead to such a frustration at the club that she
buys a new packet and consumes it once it is at hand. Again, restricting herself
to a speciﬁed amount of just a few can be rational from the planning perspective
given that there is a chance to meet other smokers at the club. This probability
she can judge.
In the following chapters we will explicate these intuitions by analysing the
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problem again in a formal language. We will set up a model of dual selves and
stick to a framework where a person at home plans for some social situation she
is going to face. Herein the person at home is considered as the ﬁrst economic
agent who we call the planning self and the person facing the social situation is
considered as the second economic agent who we call the enjoying self.
4. MODEL SETUP
The basic logic of our model is inspired by a model of taxation as the one used
in Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 2006). Another analogy to their work is our
understanding of a breach of resolution which is similar to their interpretation
of a revolution. This is not surprising, since in a way, Acemoglu and Robinson
are considering the distributional conﬂict within a society and so are we. While
their society is composed of conﬂicting classes, ours is composed of conﬂicting
selves. As our model functions like a taxation model it requires an interagent
comparability of utilities since utils are transferred from one agent to the other
during the course of the game. What one agent gets, the other agent has to give
up. Relying on a concept of interagent transferability of utilities, our approach
has the advantage of being able to discuss personal welfare implications similar
to social welfare implications, underlining once more that our person is in fact a
(small) society of selves.
Consider two players or agents, Si,i = {p,e}, referred to as planning self (Sp)
and enjoying self (Se). Both agents together form the identity of a biological
person. Each of them takes control over the body at diﬀerent points in time.
The respective agent can determine the acts of the person alone for the time of
his ‘reign’. At the beginning of the period, in t = 0, Sp decides about the acts
of the person.
4.1. Timing
The course of a period is as follows:
1. In t = 0 Sp decides about its level of concessions, denoted by γ ∈ [0,1],
and accordingly forms a resolution.
2. In t = 1 nature determines the realization of the environmental variable,
denoted by µ ∈ [0,1].
3. In t = 2 Sp is passive but able to remind Se of the formed resolution. Se
observes the realization of µ and decides whether to adhere to the resolution
or whether to break it, denoted by ρ ∈ {0,1}.
4. In t = 3 both agents experience their payoﬀs.
4.2. The Inner Disbalance as Driver of Conﬂict
The utility function of Si is given by ui. Sp can perfectly anticipate Se’s utility.
By the parameter θ we measure the inner disbalance of the person by comparing
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the initial utilities of both selves. By initial utilities we mean the utilities of
consumption abstinence in the social situation, ui(A).
(1) θ =
up(A)
up(A) + ue(A)
.
We assume that up(A) > ue(A) > 0. Thus, it follows that θ ∈ (1
2,1). The
crucial aspect we capture here is that Se values consumption abstinence in a
social situation less than Sp. Thus, there exists always an inner disbalance, which
is more severe if the divergence between the initial utilities of both selves, and
accordingly θ, is larger. Technically, θ is the magnitude of state-dependency
since for a relatively high θ the state matters more for the relative judgement
of a given prospect. In this case, moving from the state of planning for to the
state of acting in a social situation causes a larger divergence between the state-
dependent utilities for the prospect ‘abstinence in social situation’.
4.3. Concessions by Generous Resolutions
Sp as Stackelberg leader can improve Se’s well-being in the social situation by
making concessions in form of a generous resolution.
We assume that utilities after granting concessions, γ, are given by
(2) ui(γ) = (1 − γ)ui(A) + (γ − C(γ))
up(A) + ue(A)
2
.
Note that higher concessions mean higher consumption of an ambivalent good.
The ﬁrst term of (2) captures the negative concession aspect which is less im-
portant for Se than for Sp. This is true since Se’s initial utility is lower by
assumption, up(A) > ue(A). The second term of (2) captures the positive con-
cession aspect which is, vice versa, more important for Se than for Sp for the
same reason. The positive concession aspect is diluted by cognitive dissonance,
C(γ), where γ ≥ C(γ) ∀γ. We assume dC
dγ > 0 and d
2C
dγ2 > 0, which means cog-
nitive dissonance gets increasingly worse as the level of concessions rises. The
larger θ and the lower C(γ), the stronger is the redistribution of utils from Sp
to Se for any given level of concessions. Since we assume utility symmetry be-
tween the two selves, redistribution eﬀects are solely driven by the divergence of
initial utilities. Thus, (2) works like a lump sum transfer in taxation models (see
Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, pp. 101 - 103).
4.4. Breach of Resolution
The environmental parameter µ is a random variable. Let f(µ) be the den-
sity function of µ, where
R 1
µ=0 f(µ)dµ = 1. Sp knows the distribution of the
Jena Economic Research Papers 2009 - 060THE RESOLUTION GAME 9
environmental parameter, f(µ). The environmental parameter determines which
fraction of Se’s utility will be lost if it breaks the resolution. This represents the
height of Se’s inhibition threshold.
The idea is that overcoming one’s inhibitions to break the resolution and to
achieve cognitive consonance is costly. The parameter is environmental since
the intensity of psychological eﬀort and therefore the height of the inhibition
threshold. This threshold depends on the applied social norm of the social envi-
ronment, i.e. its consumption adversity. A social environment with strong social
norms against consumption would mean a right skewed distribution of µ. This
makes a low inhibition threshold ceteris paribus more likely than a neutral en-
vironment. Sp cannot inﬂuence the social environment, nor can it avoid that Se
faces it except by staying at home. This is not considered as an alternative in
our framework by assumption.
The action variable of Se concerns the breach of resolution and is expressed
by ρ. We assume the following.
If Se adheres to the resolution, ρ = 0, the utility levels, ui, are given by (2).
If Se breaks the resolution, ρ = 1, the utility levels are given by
(3) ue(ρ = 1|γ) = (1 − µ)(up(A) + ue(A)),
and
(4) up(ρ = 1|γ) = 0.
Comparing (3) and (4) we can see that by a breach of resolution Se can only
improve its well-being at the expense of Sp. The second bracket of the right-
hand side of (3) is due to the fact that Se annexes all of Sp’s utility by a breach
of resolution. The ﬁrst bracket expresses that for doing so it has to cross its
inhibition threshold paying a total utility fraction of µ. (4) is the other side of
the medal: all of Sp’s utility is annexed as the outcome is no longer a compromise.
Once Se has broken the resolution and achieved cognitive consonance it will know
no bounds and consume its satiation level. This is worst case from the perspective
of Sp causing it a zero utility. Note that this would have to be expected in any
case without a resolution as by our deﬁnition there would not be any cognitive
dissonance and no inhibitions for Se in the ﬁrst place. For Sp forming a resolution
is a dominant strategy by assumption.
5. MODEL ANALYSIS
Subsection 5.1. determines the emerging extent of resolutions chosen by Sp
derived from backward induction. Subsection 5.2. considers the welfare implica-
tions of the equilibrium resolution and contrasts them with external self-binding
devices.
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5.1. The Optimal Resolution
Remember that the preferred prospect from the perspective of Sp would be
consumption abstinence (A) giving it an unreduced utility of up(A). Se’s utility
in this case is ue(A), where up(A) > ue(A).
To obtain the optimal resolution Sp chooses, let us ﬁrst consider the range
of µ at which Se adheres to the resolution. This range follows from the level of
concessions, γ ∈ [0,1], made by Sp. A resolution is adhered to if ue(ρ = 0|γ) ≥
ue(ρ = 1|γ) implying
(1 − γ)ue(A) +
(γ − C(γ))(up(A) + ue(A))
2
≥ (1 − µ)(up(A) + ue(A)),
or, by exploitation of (1),
(5) µ ≥ (1 − γ)θ +
γ + C(γ)
2
.
Thus, we can deﬁne a critical value of the inhibition threshold, e µ, by
(6) e µ = (1 − γ)θ +
γ + C(γ)
2
,
where Se is just indiﬀerent between adhering to and breaking the resolution.
The crucial point is that Sp can inﬂuence this critical value via the level of
concessions respectively the generosity of the resolution it chooses.
The ﬁrst and second derivative of (6) are given by
(7)
de µ
dγ
= −θ +
1
2
+
1
2
dC(γ)
dγ
,
and
(8)
d2e µ
dγ2 =
1
2
d2C(γ)
dγ2
From (7) we can see that the critical value can be reduced by making higher
concessions respectively forming more generous resolutions till the level of con-
cessions equals γ∗, which is implicitly given by
dC(γ
∗)
dγ = 2θ − 1. From this level
on, making higher concessions increases the critical value again as the convexity
of cognitive dissonance becomes rampant. e µ is therefore U-shaped in γ. This is
illustrated by the upper curve in Figure 1, where we assumed C(γ) = 1
2γ2. If µ
takes on a value below this curve Se will break the resolution.
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Figure 1.— Critical environmental parameter and cognitive dissonance
Sp’s utility is
(9) up(γ) =
(
0, if µ ∈ [0, e µ),
(1 − γ)up(A) +
γ−C(γ)
2 , if µ ∈ [e µ,1].
Given (6) and (9) we can derive an optimal level of concessions made by Sp.
Proposition 1. The unique optimal level of concessions made by Sp in the
resolution game is given by
(10)
f(e µ(b γ|θ))
1 − F(e µ(b γ|θ))
=
θ +
b γ−1
2
(
C(b γ)−b γ
2 − (1 − b γ)θ)
de µ(b γ|θ)
dγ
,
where Sp’s optimal concession is strictly smaller than the concession minimizing
the critical inhibition threshold, i.e. b γ < γ∗. With an increasing inner disbalance,
θ, Sp’s optimal concession increases as well.
Proof. See appendix. 
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5.2. Personal Welfare Implications
Assume the existence of a benevolent dictator who is considering paternalistic
intervention for the sake of the person, for example by imposing a prohibition
of consumption. The welfare implications of our analysis that we will discuss
in the following are considerations of an omniscient outside observer. Since we
analyzed the person as a society of selves it seems natural to look at social
welfare criteria which for our case will mean personal welfare criteria. Using a
Benthamite personal welfare function the utility of the person, uT, is the sum of
the utilities of both agents. If Se adheres to the resolution uT is speciﬁed by the
sum of up and ue being
(11) uT(ρ = 0|γ) = (1 − C(γ))(up(A) + ue(A)).
If Se breaks the resolution the person’s utility is speciﬁed by the sum of (3)
and (4) which is, since Sp’s utility is reduced to zero, simply Se’s utility and
therefore
(12) uT(ρ = 1|γ) = (1 − µ)(up(A) + ue(A)).
Thus, we can see that within a Benthamite framework for any given conces-
sional level it is welfare maximizing from the person’s perspective that Se adheres
to the corresponding resolution if uT(ρ = 0|γ) ≥ uT(ρ = 1|γ) implying
(1 − C(γ))(up(A) + ue(A)) ≥ (1 − µ)(up(A) + ue(A)),
or
(13) µ ≥ C(γ).
If the inhibition threshold to break any given resolution is weakly larger than
the cognitive dissonance caused by adhering to this resolution, it is personal wel-
fare maximizing to adhere to it. Vice versa, if the inhibition threshold is lower, it
is personal welfare maximizing to break it. Since this is true for any concessional
level and its corresponding resolution it is also true, especially, for γ = b γ being
Sp’s optimal concession. The lower curve in Figure 1 represents the cognitive
dissonance. If µ takes on a value below this curve it is welfare optimal to break
the resolution.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium a resolution is broken more often than a Ben-
thamite welfare maximum suggests.
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Proof. Actually, any given resolution will be adhered to by Se if (5) holds.
(5) can be rewritten as
(14) µ ≥ αC(γ) + (1 − γ)θ, α =
1
2
+
1
2
γ
C(γ)
≥ 1.
Comparing the criterion for the Benthamite personal welfare maximum in (13)
with the actual criterion in (14) we can see that the resolution is broken more
often than welfare maximal since the right-hand side of (14) is larger for any
given γ < 1. Especially, this is also true for γ = b γ since b γ < 2θ − 1 < 1. 
Let us now for comparative reasons consider the welfare implications of the
availability of external self-binding devices for Sp. The use of an external device
by Sp restricts the action space of Se to the singleton ρ ∈ {0}. Sp therefore
excludes the possibility of a breach of resolution by Se when using this option
and will thus combine it with the strictest possible resolution of abstinence.
As we have seen, in a world without the availability of external self-binding
devices Sp will choose a concessional level, i.e. form a resolution such that its
expected utility is maximized. We called this concessional level b γ. If we allow for
the possibility of external self-binding the action set of Sp gets richer because it
gets an additional strategic option.
Sp will choose to use an external self-binding device instead of b γ, if its utility
from external self-binding (S) is larger, up(S) > E(u)p(b γ), implying
(1−φ)up(A) > ((1−b γ)up(A)+
(b γ − C(b γ))
2
(up(A)+ue(A)))(1−F(e µ(b γ|θ)))
or
(15) b γ −
b γ − C(b γ)
2θ
+ (
b γ − C(b γ)
2θ
+ (1 − γ))F(e µ(b γ|θ)) > φ.
φ is the cost of the external self-binding device. This could be psychological
costs of embarrassment or a reputational loss due to getting a third party in-
volved.3 We assume that both selves symmetrically suﬀer from embarrassment.
If the external self-binding device is comparatively cheap, i.e. (15) holds, Sp will
choose to use this device. Otherwise, Sp will prefer to make a concession of b γ
giving it an expected utility which is at least as high.
3An example causing embarrassment could be to admit a lack of self-control by giving away
car keys to prevent oneself from drinking (see Elster 2000, p. 66). Monetary costs are less
common but also imaginable. Bloom (2008) quotes a suggestion to remove your internet cable
and FedEx it to yourself to have one day of work without online distractions. FedEx charges a
monetary price, of course.
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In case (13) holds, it will be personal welfare maximizing that Se adheres to
the resolution, ρ = 0. In this case the external self-binding alternative will be
welfare superior if uT(S) > uT(ρ = 0|γ) implying
(1 − φ)(up(A) + ue(A)) > (1 − C(γ))(up(A) + ue(A))
or
(16) C(γ) > φ.
If (13) does not hold, it will be welfare maximizing that Se breaks the resolu-
tion, ρ = 1. Then, the external self-binding alternative will be welfare superior
if uT(S) > uT(ρ = 1|γ) implying
(1 − φ)(up(A) + ue(A)) > (1 − µ)(up(A) + ue(A))
or
(17) µ > φ.
Proposition 3. In equilibrium the external self binding device is used more
frequently than a Benthamite welfare maximum suggests.
Proof. Actually, Sp uses an external self-binding device if (15) holds. In case
(13) holds, by comparing (15) and (16) we can see that external self-binding
devices are used too frequently from a Benthamite personal welfare maximizing
perspective. This is true since the left-hand side of the welfare maximizing cri-
terion in (16) is smaller than the one of the actual criterion in (15). To see this,
note that
2θγ−γ+C(γ)
2θ ≥ C(γ), assuring that the right-hand side of (15) is clearly
bigger than C(γ). In case (13) does not hold, the left-hand side of (17) is even
smaller since C(γ) > µ by assumption. Therefore, we can see that self-binding
devices are used even more frequently than in the ﬁrst case which gets us further
away from the Benthamite personal welfare maximizing extent of use. Note that
since this is true for any concessional level and its corresponding resolution it is,
especially, true for the concession that Sp will choose, γ = b γ. 
Summing up these results we can see that when using a Benthamite welfare
function the person will never achieve her welfare maximum. In a world without
external self-binding devices resolutions are broken too often by trend since Se is
not taking the external eﬀect of its actions on Sp into consideration. Accordingly,
in a world with external self-binding devices Sp is making use of its costly power
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instrument too often. From a benevolent Benthamite dictator’s perspective this
is a dilemma that the person with the conﬂicting preferences we assumed cannot
escape by herself. From her perspective a prohibition would seem appropriate
since it leaves each self with ui(A), therefore maximizing personal welfare.
Note that the Benthamite position implies a clear value judgment which is
of course arbitrarily chosen. Without going into details we would like to stress
that switching to another personal welfare criterion could change welfare im-
plications dramatically. Using a more egalitarian personal welfare criterion like
the Bernoulli-Nash welfare function would condemn unequal utility distributions
between the two selves and thus condemn a consumption prohibition in case of
a strong inner disbalance. This is ignored by the Benthamite criterion. Refusing
any kind of welfare function and applying a personal Pareto criterion as minimum
consensus, it would judge each result the person achieves by herself as Pareto
eﬃcient since any deviation from this status quo would lead to a worsening of
the situation of one self.
6. CONCLUSION
There is an emerging literature in behavioral economics trying to capture an-
alytically the observation that human behavior often contradicts to neoclassical
assumptions. We argue that giving up the assumption of the permanent identity
between an acting person and a single economic agent can account for observed
data without abandoning the neoclassical method.
This paper formulates a basic framework adapting a taxation model to explain
the formation of resolutions. We assume the sequential existence of two agents in
a person, being induced by diﬀerent states and being in conﬂict with each other.
This is a conﬂict that they are resolving in the intertemporal dimension. As there
is no direct communication between the agents and though no kind of direct
power contest, the only way to moderate consumption of a future agent is to
form a more or less generous resolution or to use an external self-binding device.
The ﬁnal choice of an adequate device results from the utility maximization
approach and depends both on the environmental expectations of the Stackelberg
leader and the speciﬁc device costs. We have found unique equilibrium solutions
allowing concrete empirical tests.
Without the suggestion of a concrete experimental design to test the predic-
tions for certain parameter constellations we would like to stress the crucial point
of state-dependency. One needs two diﬀerent frames inducing conﬂicting individ-
ual choices to activate one of the agents in each frame. Participants would have
to experience their conﬂict several times before their inner disbalance is mea-
sured as it is crucial that they are well aware of it. The less artiﬁcial and the
closer to real life experience the situation is the better it works.
Our discussion about the welfare implications of our analysis can be seen
as a postulation to make the implicit value judgments of paternalistic policies
explicit. These policies mostly promote the interests of a long-term interested
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self which could be compared to the planning self in our model. As pointed out
by other authors before, this is at least a debatable value judgment. Primarily,
the presented framework wants to sensitize policy makers to be self-reﬂexive and
transparent concerning their underlying norms. Gul and Pesendorfer (2008)
criticize heavily the use of multiple selves models in the context of hyperbolic
discounting frameworks for the arbitrariness of the welfare criteria used by the
respective authors. Even though we share Gul and Pesendorfer’s objection we
do not think that this is a problem of the multiple selves notion itself but of
the unreﬂected way in which welfare criteria are applied. The notion of multiple
selves does, on the contrary, suggest an emancipation of selves as default. Finally,
it is the general question of human rationality which hovers above our model.
Once taking on the Heraclitean perspective an unquestionable best interest of a
person no longer exists.
7. APPENDIX
The expected utility of Sp is
E(u)p(γ|θ) = ((1 − γ)up(A) +
(γ − C(γ))
2
(up(A) + ue(A)))
Z 1
e µ(γ|θ)
f(µ)dµ
= ((1 − γ)up(A) +
(γ − C(γ))
2
(up(A) + ue(A)))(1 − F(e µ(γ|θ))).
Optimization calculus over γ implies
d
dγ
E(u)p(γ|θ) = 0,
which means
d
dγ
(1 − γ)up(A)(1 − F(e µ(γ|θ)))
+
d
dγ
γ
2
(up(A) + ue(A))(1 − F(e µ(γ|θ)))
−
d
dγ
C(γ)
2
(up(A) + ue(A))(1 − F(e µ(γ|θ))) = 0,
or
−up(A)(1 − F(e µ(γ|θ))) − (1 − γ)up(A)f(e µ(γ|θ))
de µ(γ|θ)
dγ
+
1
2
(up(A) + ue(A))(1 − F(e µ(γ|θ))) −
γ
2
(up(A) + ue(A))f(e µ(γ|θ))
de µ(γ|θ)
dγ
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−
γ
2
(up(A)+ue(A))(1−F(e µ(γ|θ)))+
C(γ)
2
(up(A)+ue(A))f(e µ(γ|θ))
de µ(γ|θ)
dγ
= 0.
Dividing the equation by (up(A) + ue(A)) and rearranging it gives (10),
f(e µ(b γ|θ))
1 − F(e µ(b γ|θ))
=
θ +
b γ−1
2
(
C(b γ)−b γ
2 − (1 − b γ)θ)
de µ(b γ|θ)
dγ
.
Given the positive left-hand side of (10), note that the expression on the right-
hand side is positive if and only if b γ < γ∗. While (
C(b γ)−b γ
2 − (1 − b γ)θ) is always
negative since γ ≥ C(γ) ∀γ by assumption, the right-hand side gets positive
only in case
de µ(b γ|θ)
dγ < 0. Given the U-shaped form of e µ(γ|θ) with e µ(γ∗|θ) <
e µ(γ0|θ) ∀γ0 6= γ∗, clearly
de µ(b γ|θ)
dγ < 0 only if γ < γ∗. Thus, b γ < γ∗.
Since
∂F(e µ(b γ|θ))
∂b γ 6= 0, F(e µ(b γ|θ)) deﬁnes b γ as an implicit function of θ. The
question is now, how b γ changes if θ changes marginally. By total diﬀerentiation
we get
db γ
dθ
= −
∂F(e µ(b γ|θ))/∂θ
∂F(e µ(b γ|θ))/∂b γ
,
or
∂e µ(b γ|θ)
∂b γ
= −
∂e µ(b γ|θ)
∂θ
db γ
dθ
.
By substituting the above expression into (10) we obtain
f(e µ(b γ|θ))
1 − F(e µ(b γ|θ))
=
(θ +
b γ−1
2 )
db γ
dθ
−(
C(b γ)−b γ
2 − (1 − b γ)θ)
∂e µ(b γ|θ)
∂θ
.
Since
∂e µ(b γ|θ)
dθ > 0, (12) shows that
db γ
dθ > 0. 
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